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ABSTRACT
Emergence of online content voting networks allows users
to share and rate content including social news, photos and
videos. The basic idea behind online content voting net-
works is that aggregate user activities (e.g., submitting and
rating content) makes high-quality content thrive through the
unprecedented scale, high dynamics and divergent quality of
user generated content (UGC). To better understand the na-
ture and impact of online content voting networks, we have
analyzed Digg, a popular online social news aggregator and
rating website. Based on a large amount of data collected,
we provide an in-depth study of Digg. In particular, we study
structural properties of Digg social network, impact of social
network properties on user digging activities and vice versa,
distribution of user diggs, content promotion, and informa-
tion filtering. We also provide insight into design of content
promotion algorithms and recommendation-assisted content
discovery. Overall, we believe that the results presented in
this paper are crucial in understanding online content rating
networks.
1. INTRODUCTION
The advent of user generated content (UGC) has dra-
matically reshaped the landscape of Internet, shifting
the role of many websites from creating online content
to providing facilities for Internet users to publish their
own content and empowering the role of Internet users
from content consumers only to content publishers, ref-
erees and consumers. Online content rating networks
are among such websites. Example systems include
YouTube [8], Flickr [3] and Digg [2] where users share
and rate videos, photos and news, respectively.
Driven by unprecedented scale, high dynamics and di-
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vergent quality of UGC, online content rating networks
are creating new viewing patterns, information filtering
techniques, content discovery channels and social inter-
actions. One striking feature in online content rating
networks is that popularity and availability of content
are driven by users’ participation, i.e., rating or voting
on content. For example, Digg and Flickr have a front
page that features popular content which is representa-
tive of what a wide base of Internet users like the most.
Content displayed in the front page often receives sev-
eral million views per day, opening up opportunity for
adversarial users and advertisers to game the system [6].
The tension between the finite space of the front page
and proliferation of UGC, also calls for effective content
discovery channels for users to find interesting content.
Moreover, online content voting networks include a so-
cial network: users establish friend relationships. The
social network can affect the way users share, search,
browse and rate content; on the other hand, users’ ac-
tivities such as submitting and rating content can help
build up friend relationships and thus boost their profile
within the community [1].
To understand the nature and impact of online con-
tent voting networks, we in this paper analyze Digg, a
popular social news aggregator and voting website. The
main contribution of this paper is an extensive trace-
driven analysis of users’ digging activities on submit-
ted stories. To this extent, we have collected a large
amount of digg data spanning from the launch of Digg
(2004/12/01) to 2009/04/16. We have also crawled the
social network graph, more specifically, the large weakly
connected component (WCC). To the best of our knowl-
edge, this work is the first to extensively study user
voting activities on content, and impact of the social
network on content rating and vice versa. Our analy-
sis yields very interesting findings regarding structural
properties of the social network, the distribution of user
diggs, content promotion (e.g., mark a story popular
and surface it to the front page), content filtering, con-
tent censorship and content discovery.
The highlights of our work could be summarized as
follows:
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• We analyze the structural properties of Digg social
network. We show that Digg differs from many
other online social networks [18] in that it has low
link symmetry and weak correlation of indegree
and outdegree, and nodes tend to connect to other
nodes with different degree from their own.
• By analyzing the correlation of users’ social rela-
tionships and their digging activities, we show that
users with more visibility (i.e., befriended by more
users) within the community tend to vote more
frequently. Users are not equally powerful and top
users with high visibility tend to have high digging
power in making stories popular.
• We reveal that the number of diggs and digg rate
are influential to promotion of a story, and provide
evidence of content censorship. Our findings also
indicate existence of spam diggs.
• Two main information filters are present in Digg:
the friends interface filters stories by the friends’
activities and the story promotion algorithm sifts
stories by users’ aggregate votes. We show that
information filtering impacts on users viewing and
rating content. The promotion algorithm has sub-
stantially more influence on users than the friends
interface.
• Leveraging our findings, we provide insight into
design of the story promotion algorithm and a
recommendation-assisted content discovery mech-
anism that helps users to find interesting content.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.
Section 2 describes background on Digg and measure-
ment methodology. We analyze structural properties
of the social network in Section 3 and user digging ac-
tivities in Section 4. Implications of our findings are
discussed in Section 5. Section 6 provides related work
and we conclude the paper in Section 7.
2. BACKGROUND AND MEASUREMENT
METHODOLOGY
2.1 Background
Digg is a popular online news aggregation site where
users submit and rate stories. When a user submits a
story, the story is first placed on the upcoming stories
section, which is the place where users browse recently
submitted stories and digg what they like the best. If
a story receives enough diggs (In the rest of the paper,
we use vote and digg interchangeably) and meets pro-
motion requirements, the story gets promoted and is
moved to the popular stories section which we all the
front page. In the front page, stories are more visible
to the community and can receives several million visits
per day.
Digg includes a social network: A registered user
can invite other registered users as her friends; a user
can also be befriended by other users who become her
fans. The friend and fan links create a directional graph
among users. Through the friends interface, Digg al-
lows users to track friends’ activities (stories they re-
cently submitted or voted for).
To investigate structural properties of Digg social net-
work, we focus on the large weakly connected compo-
nent (WCC) as it is structurally the most interesting
part of a social network [18]. To investigate nature and
impact of user digging activities, we collect digg data of
the users in the WCC. As will be shown later, the ma-
jority (about 90.75%) of diggs submitted by entire com-
munity come from the WCC. In subsequent sections, we
describe the process of graph crawl and data collection,
followed by high-level statistics of our crawled data.
2.2 Crawling the WCC
We used the Digg API “List Users” to crawl the
WCC. Our crawl started with the user “kevinrose”, the
founder of Digg and inserted the user name into an ini-
tially empty queue. At each step, our crawl script re-
moved a user from the queue, retrieved a list of the
user’s friends and fans, and added unvisited friends and
fans into the queue. The crawl script continued until
the queue is exhausted. Digg limits the rate at which
a single IP address can download information. It took
about one week to crawl the WCC and The crawling
process ended on March 16, 2009.
2.3 Data Collection
Most of the data analyzed in this paper is about
user diggs. Via the Digg API “List Events”, for each
user in the graph we fetched her diggs submitted be-
tween 2004/12/01 and 2009/03/16. We call this digg
data trace Primary Trace (PT). In addition, we col-
lected one month worth of digg data trace spanning
from 2009/03/17 to 2009/04/16, which we call Sec-
ondary Trace (ST). ST is used to examine correlation
of the user graph and user digging activities because:
(1) the user graph was evolving as users joined over the
time period of PT; and (2) the crawled graph is a snap-
shot of Digg social network around 2009/03/16 and is
assumed to be relatively stable over the duration of ST.
2.4 High-level Statistics
Table 1 shows some high-level statistics of the data
we collected. Other statistics of the data, such as diggs
received by upcoming and popular stories in PT, will
be presented in subsequent analyses. Note that diggs
submitted by users in WCC constitute 90.75% of total
diggs submitted by the entire community. This shows
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Table 1: High-level statistics of Digg crawl.
# of nodes in WCC 580, 228
# of friend links in WCC 6, 757, 789
Avg. # of friends per user 11.65
Frac. of links symmetric 39.4%
Duration of PT 2004/12/01 - 2009/03/16
# of diggs in PT 154, 129, 256
Avg. # of diggs per user in PT 265
Duration of ST 2009/03/17 - 2009/04/16
Frac. of users in WCC dugg in ST 0.22
# of submitted stories in ST 257, 536
# of popular stories in ST 4, 571
# of upcoming stories in ST 252, 965
Frac. of diggs submitted by WCC 90.75%
that WCC is not only structurally the most interesting
component in the social network, but also logically the
most valuable piece in analysis of user diggs. In the rest
of the paper, we use node and user interchangeably.
3. ANALYSIS OF NETWORK STRUCTURE
In this section, we characterize the structural prop-
erties of the Digg social network, to answer a major
question: Does the Digg social network show similar
structural characteristics with other online social net-
works [17, 18].
3.1 Link Symmetry
Links in many previously studied online social net-
works are directed and therefore a user may link to any
other users she wishes. For instance, a user may in-
vite any other users to be her friends. Upon acceptance
of the invitation, the invitee may reciprocate by point-
ing back to the inviter (often without scrutiny), thereby
creating a high degree of link symmetry. Previous stud-
ies [18, 17] have observed a significant level of reciprocity
in Flickr, LiveJournal [4], YouTube, Yahoo! 360 [7] and
Okurt [5], ranging from 62% to 100%.
Table 1 shows reciprocity of the Digg graph is 39.4%,
far lower than that of the aforementioned online social
networks. The Web graph does not show a high level of
link symmetry among web pages, and thus search en-
gines leverage this to identify reputed source of informa-
tion (pages with high indegree tend to be authorities) to
rank search results (i.e., PageRank [20]). As will be dis-
cussed later, our findings suggest Digg possibly suffers
Sybil attacks by which attackers create many identities
to digg a story in order to surface it to the front page.
The low level of link symmetry in Digg graph may allow
us to defend against Sybil attacks by using PageRank-
like algorithms to rank users and weigh their votes.
3.2 Power-law Node Degree
One striking property of online social networks is
that their node degree distribution follows a power-law.
That is, the majority of nodes have small degree while
a few nodes have significantly higher degree. Figure 1
shows the indegree and outdegree complementary cu-
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Figure 1: Log-log plot of indegree (left) and out-
degree (right) complementary cumulative distri-
bution functions (CCDF). Digg network shows
properties consistent with power-law networks.
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Figure 2: Plot of the distribution of links across
nodes.
mulative distribution functions (CCDF) for Digg so-
cial network. Digg exhibits behavior consistent with
a power-law network. For the power-law distribution of
node indegree, the most straightforward explanation is
the preferential attachment process: the probability of
a user i connecting to a user j is proportional to the
number of j’s existing fans (or incoming links).
Compared to the previously studied online social net-
works [18], Digg however has a less number of high-
outdegree nodes and their outdegree is significantly lower.
Note a sharp drop at the degree of 1, 025. We have con-
jectured that Digg users not passionate in building an
very large number of friend links is mainly because sub-
mitting and digging stories are probably more effective
to boost their profiles within the Digg community [1].
Figure 2 plots the distribution of incoming and out-
going links across nodes in Digg graph. Digg shows
similar distributions for incoming and outgoing links.
For example, about 1.5% of users account for 60% of all
incoming and outgoing links. The difference between
the two curves mainly comes from the fact that a sig-
nificant portion (55.21%) of users do not have friends.
3.3 Correlation of Indegree and Outdegree
In social networks such as YouTube, Flickr and Live-
Journal, the nodes with high outdegree tend to have
high indegree. For example, in all these three networks,
the top 1% of nodes ordered by outdegree has a more
than 65% overlap with the top 1% of nodes ranked by
indegree [18]. The left plot in Figure 3 shows the ex-
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Figure 3: Plot of the overlap between top x% of
nodes ranked by outdegree and indegree (left)
and CDF of outdegree to indegree ratio (right).
tent of the overlap between the top x% of nodes sorted
by indegree and outdegree. Digg exhibits less overlap
between the top x% of nodes ranked by indegree and
outdegree. For instance, the top 1% of nodes ordered by
outdegree has a 58% overlap with the top 1% of nodes
ranked by indegree. We have extrapolated that many
high-indegree users have boosted their visibility to the
community by submitting and digging stories, instead
of aggressively making friends.
In addition, we examined the indegree and outde-
gree of individual nodes in Digg. The right plot in Fig-
ure 3 shows the cumulative distribution of outdergee-to-
indegree ratio for Digg. The CDF for Digg differs from
those of YouTube, LiveJournal and Flickr in two ways:
(1) about 55.21% of nodes have outdgree of zero; and
(2) about 14.56% of nodes have an indegree within 20%
of their outdegree while the percentage for the other
three social networks is more than 50% [18].
In summary, Digg exhibits much weaker correlation
of indegree and outdegree than the other three social
networks. This can be explained by a much lower level
of link symmetry in Digg social network.
3.4 Link Degree Correlation
Which users tend to connect to each other in Digg?
To answer this question, we used the joint degree dis-
tribution (JDD) which is approximated by the degree
correlation function Knn. Knn denotes a mapping be-
tween outdegree and the average indegree of all nodes
connected to nodes of that outdegree: an increasing
Knn implies a tendency of higher-degree nodes to con-
nect to other high-degree nodes while a decreasing Knn
indicates the opposite trend. The left plot in Figure 4
depicts Knn for Digg. Unlike Flickr, LiveJournal and
Okurt observed in [18], Digg exhibits the “celebrity”-
driven nature. That is, there are a few extremely pop-
ular users in Digg to whom many unpopular users link.
To further explore this phenomenon, we calculated
the assortativity coefficient r, a measure of the likeli-
hood for nodes to connect to other nodes with similar
degree. The assortativity coefficient r value lies between
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Figure 4: Log-log plot of the outdegree versus
the average indegree of friends (left) and aver-
age clustering coefficient of users with different
outdegrees (right).
−1 and 1; a big r indicates tendency of nodes to link
to nodes of similar degree and a negative r implies that
nodes tend to link to nodes with very different degree
from their own. We found that the assortativity coeffi-
cient r for Digg is −0.019.
3.5 Clustering Coefficient
Next, we explore connection density of the neighbor-
hood of a node, which is quantified by the clustering co-
efficient. Formally speaking, the clustering coefficient
of a node with N neighbors is defined as ratio of the
number of directed links existing between the node’s N
neighbors and the number of possible directed links that
could exist between the node’s neighbors (N(N − 1)).
The clustering coefficient of the Digg graph is the av-
erage of individual nodes’ clustering coefficients, with a
typical value of 0.218. This is consistent with those of
YouTube, Okurt, Flickr and LiveJournal (ranging from
0.136 to 0.330) [18]. It shows that users in social net-
works tend to be introduced to other users via mutual
friends, increasing the probability that two friends of a
single user are also friends. The right plot in Figure 4
shows the clustering coefficients of nodes with respect
to their outdegree. Nodes of low outdegree have higher
clustering coefficients, indicating significant clustering
among low-outdegree nodes. High-outdegree nodes, on
the other hand, show much lower clustering coefficients
due to their large number of diverse friends.
3.6 Summary
We conclude this section with a brief of summary
of important structural properties of the Digg social
network we observed in our data:
• The degree distributions follow a power law. Un-
like many other social networks, Digg has a less
number of high-outdegree nodes and their outde-
gree is significantly lower; this is explained by the
fact that submitting and digging stories are more
effective to boost their popularity within the com-
munity.
• Compared to many other social networks, Digg
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shows a much lower level of link symmetry and
weaker correlation of indegree and outdegree. Nodes
tend to connect to nodes with very different degree
from their own.
• Low-outdegree nodes have higher clustering coeffi-
cients than high-outdegree nodes. This hints that
Digg seems to be composed of a large number of
highly connected clusters consisting of low-degree
nodes, and these clusters link to each other by a
relatively small number of high-degree nodes.
4. ANALYSIS OF CONTENT VOTING AC-
TIVITIES
In Section 3 we have investigated structural prop-
erties of the Digg social network. In this section we
focus on users’ content voting activities. Unlike many
other online social networks that are centered on build-
ing social relationships and sharing information, Digg, a
news aggregator site, is centered around user voting on
submitted stories to make them popular or not. Users
vote on stories for different goals. Some users digg sto-
ries they like the best and share them with other users;
some users digg stories as a means to boost their pro-
files within the community (e.g., become a friend of the
users who submitted the stories they dugg); and some
other users attempt to game Digg to make some articles
(e.g., advertisement, and phishing articles) promoted to
the front page to receive several million page views per
day (often for profits). As a result, it is significantly im-
portant to examine users’ voting activities which is not
only helpful to understand user behavior and how sto-
ries get promoted, but also beneficial to system designs
including story promotion algorithms and resource al-
locations (e.g., promotion of stories will attract more
and more user attention including diggs and comments
which need more resources to handle).
4.1 Statistics of User Diggs
First, we quantify the total number of diggs and daily
average number of diggs submitted by individual users
in PT; we also measure the total number of diggs sub-
mitted by individual users in ST. Figure 5 depicts three
CCDFs of the total and daily average diggs 1 across
users. The top and middle plots represent the total
number of diggs in PT and ST respectively; the bottom
one denotes the daily average number of diggs in PT.
Several important observations can be made: (1) The
shapes of the two plots for total diggs closely match,
implying stable digging activities across users. (2) A
91The average diggs for a user is based on the time period
from the first time the user dugg to the end time of the trace.
We believe it is more reasonable to begin with the first time
the user dugg than the user’s registration time.
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Figure 5: Log-log plot of total diggs (top 2) and
daily average diggs complementary cumulative
distribution functions (CCDF).
significant portion of users do not vote. For example,
20.2% and 78.0% of users did not vote in PT and ST,
respectively. (3) A few users are very active in digging
stories, e.g., a couple hundred diggs per day; while an
overwhelming majority of users cast less than one vote
per day.
For the overwhelming majority of users, since they
digg infrequently, most of them probably follow a “read-
then-digg” pattern: Read an article first and then digg
it if they like it. For those users passionate in digging
stories, however, they may follow a different pattern.
We illustrate this by an example. Suppose an active
user diggs 200 stories per day and follows a “read-then-
digg” pattern. Also assume that reading an article
(probably also spending time finding the stories) takes
2.5 minutes. Then, the active user has to spend more
than 8 hours a day. This is a large amount of time
invested in Digg unless we suspect the user of either
not following the “read-then-digg” pattern (e.g., dig-
ging stories solely to boost her profile in the Digg com-
munity) or using an automatic script.
Thus, we analyze the time intervals between a user’s
consecutive diggs. The left plot in Figure 6 displays
PDF of time intervals between consecutive diggs by
users in PT. Note that the time intervals follow a power-
law distribution. Most of diggs by individual users are
submitted close in time. In particular, about 35% of
diggs are submitted within one minute or less 2 after
their previous diggs. Such diggs unlikely result from the
“read-then-digg” pattern because of the time to (find
and) read an article.
Diggs submitted by automatic scripts are most likely
to be close in time. Golder et al. have used 5 seconds
as the threshold of inter-message time for automatically
generated messages and manual ones [14]. They clas-
sify those Facebook messages written within 5 seconds
of the previous messages as spam. We do not intend
to argue whether or not 5 seconds are an appropriate
threshold to mark user diggs as spam or to infer user
diggs generated by automatic scripts. The right plot in
92If the inter-digg time interval is less than 1 minute, we
round it up to 1 minute.
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Figure 6: Log-log plot of PDF of time intervals
between users’ consecutive diggs in PT (left) and
percentages of diggs submitted within 5, 10 and
60 seconds of their previous diggs (right).
Figure 6 shows percentages of diggs submitted within
5, 10 and 60 seconds of inter-digg time. Both PT and
ST have similar characteristics: A significant portion of
diggs are indeed submitted close in time; for example,
over 12.75% of diggs are generated within 5 seconds of
their previous diggs.
Inter-digg time interval is important to characterize
a user’s digging behavior. A user whose diggs are very
close in time, very likely diggs a story not upon its con-
tent but for other purposes. For example, to boost her
profile in the community, a user diggs stories hoping
story submitters to reciprocate by connecting to her;
a user may follow her friends to digg what they have
dugg. Also, people are gaming Digg to get their stories
(e.g., advertisement) into the front page. Subvert and
Profit [6] is a service to sell home page placement on
Digg by charging advertisers for a vote; users may sell
their votes to such service companies for profits, thereby
creating spam diggs.
User-driven social content websites like Digg, should
have to identify and handle spam votes if they want to
retain democracy of content rating which is one of the
driving factors contributing to success of today’s user-
driven social content websites. We conjecture that user
inter-digg time interval may be used to detect spam-
mers and digg spam, therefore making story promotion
algorithms resilient to spam diggs.
4.2 Correlation of Users’ Diggs and Social Links
Next, we provide data to answer two questions: (1)
Do people digg more actively if they have more friends?
(2) Do people digg more actively if they are befriended
by many others? In Figure 7 we depict the average num-
ber of diggs (the left two plots) and the average number
of daily diggs (the right two plots) against the number
of friends and fans per user respectively. We see that
the number of friends does influence the users with up
to 200 friends. That is, people digg more as the number
of friends increases until reaching 200 friends. Beyond
200 friends, there is no strong correlation of the num-
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Figure 8: Avg. number of diggs versus number
of social links. The left plot is for number of
friends and the right plot is for number of fans.
The trace ST is used.
ber of friends and digging activity. However, we observe
strong correlation of the number of fans and digging ac-
tivity: People digg more with increasing number of fans.
This can be explained by three factors: (1) People in-
crease their visibility to the community through more
diggs, and thus attract more users to connect to them
and to become their fans; (2) People with more fans
respond to “celebrity” pressure by digging more; and
(3) People with more fans are likely to have been in the
network longer, thereby accumulating more diggs. The
first two factors are like the “chicken-and-egg” problem
and it is hard to tell which dominates. To investigate
the last factor, i.e., impact of user age (the time since
registration) on the correlation of the number of fans
and digging activity, Figure 8 shows the average num-
ber of diggs vs number of friends and number of fans in
ST. ST minimizes noise of the last factor in the corre-
lation. Similar characteristics are observed, though the
correlation of the number of fans and digging activity
is slightly diluted.
4.3 Story Promotion vs User Diggs
The lifecycle of stories in Digg is as follows. A newly
submitted story first goes to the upcoming stories sec-
tion, displayed in reverse chronological order of submis-
sion time. If the story accumulates enough votes shortly
and meets promotion requirements, it will be marked as
a popular story and promoted to the front page, thereby
becoming more visible to the community and receiving
more visits. Otherwise, the story will be pushed down
in the upcoming stories section as it ages, thereby be-
coming less visible and finally getting “buried”.
While unrevealed to the public, the promotion al-
gorithm is crucial to Digg. On one hand, it should
promote the content that a wide base of users like the
most; On the other hand, it should be resilient to gam-
ing [6] and Sybil attacks. For example, in ST we have
found some upcoming stories, a significant portion of
whose received diggs come from new voters who regis-
tered on the same day of the story’s submission time.
In the crawled Digg graph, we have also found many
users whose usernames only differ in their trailing dig-
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Figure 9: CDF of number of received diggs (left)
and CDF of scores (right) for upcoming (“cir-
cle”) and popular (“square”) stories in ST. The
number of diggs for an upcoming story includes
all diggs received since the submission of the
story until the end time of ST; The number of
diggs for a popular story includes only the diggs
received prior to its promotion time.
its and whose registration times are close in time. We
do not intend to use these findings as evidence of Sybil
attacks. But, the promotion algorithm design should
take attacks into account because the most profitable
avenue for the attacks lies in the fact that the promoted
content receives several million visits per day.
To this end, we use ST to examine impact of user
diggs on story promotion 3. Specifically, we have iden-
tified that number of diggs and digg rate play influential
roles in story promotion.
The left plot in Figure 9 shows CDF of number of
diggs for upcoming and popular stories in ST. Appar-
ently, the number of diggs strongly influences whether
a story can become popular or not. Note that 92.1% of
upcoming stories received less than the cutoff value of
15 diggs while all popular stories received 15 diggs or
more before promotion. Surprisingly, 7.9% of upcoming
stories received same number of diggs as popular stories
or even more (e.g., one upcoming story received 1, 936
93We believe Digg’s story promotion algorithm under-
goes changes. We suspect that the story promotion algorithm
has changed over the long duration of PT. Thus, using ST we
are able to more accurately characterize the behavior of the
promotion algorithm due to its short duration and recency.
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Figure 10: Left: CDF of promotion ages across
popular stories in ST. Right: Average digg rates
for upcoming and popular stories in ST. Each
data point represents average dig rate for up-
coming or popular stories at each age (by hours).
diggs) but did not get promoted. We conclude that
the number of diggs is not the only factor contributing
to story promotion. Note that for popular stories we
consider only the diggs received before their promotion
while for upcoming stories we count all the diggs re-
ceived over the duration of ST. We have extrapolated
that digg rate, defined as the number of diggs received
by a story for each hour, affects promotion.
The left plot in Figure 10 shows CDF of promotion
ages across popular stories. We can see that most of
stories (88.4%) get their promotion at age of one day or
younger. All stories become popular within 3 days after
submission. We conclude that if a story will become
popular, it will get promotion very soon. This suggests
that digg rate is influential to promotion.
The right plot in Figure 10 shows average digg rates
at each age (in terms of hours) for upcoming and popu-
lar stories. It only plots data up to 3 days since all pop-
ular stories get promotion by age of 3 days. For a popu-
lar story, if it gets promoted at age of m hours, then its
diggs received after promotion are not counted and the
story is excluded from calculating the data points after
m hours. Simply put, we only show the digg rate prior
to promotion for popular stories. From the figure, we
can see that popular stories before promotion, receive a
digg rate which is one order of magnitude higher than
that of upcoming stories. We believe that the digg rate,
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particularly in the initial several hours, is very impor-
tant to story promotion. In other words, if a story does
not get sufficient diggs at its early age, it will then lose
visibility and finally get buried.
We suspect that Digg’s promotion algorithm treats
each individual vote equally. Otherwise, the promotion
algorithm is susceptible to gaming and Sybil attacks as
attackers can create many identities to vote for a story
in order to advance it to the front page. As discussed in
Section 3.1, Digg shows only 39.4% link symmetry far
lower than that of other online social networks (62% -
100%). Low level of link reciprocity makes it not only
difficult for attackers to foster trust (friend) links from
others, but also easy to identify reputed source. In-
spired by PageRank [20] to measure importance of web
pages, we used PageRank algorithm to weigh individual
diggs. First, we ran PageRank in the crawled graph and
computed a PageRank value wi for each user i. Then,
wi is used to weigh user i’s diggs. For an article A with
m votes, the score is calculated by score(A) =
∑m
k=1wk.
The right plot in Figure 9 shows CDF of scores for up-
coming and popular stories and it shows similar char-
acteristics with the left plot in Figure 9. One striking
difference is that those upcoming stories which received
more diggs than any of popular stories are subsumed by
the score curve of popular stories. This indicates that
many diggs on those upcoming stories come from in-
significant users. Again, the digg rate adversely affects
promotion of some upcoming stories with scores com-
parable to those of popular stories. In the subsequent
section, we will show other promotion-related factors.
4.4 Controlled Democracy?
It is widely believed that the content seen in the front
page is representative of what a wide base of Digg users
like the most, which leads us to believe that Digg is a
“democratic” community: the voice of the majority is
heard.
However, after examining a sample of upcoming sto-
ries whose received diggs and digg rates are comparable
to or even more than those of popular stories, we have
found evidence of content censorship on advertisement,
phishing articles and articles “offensive” to Digg. Fig-
ure 11 plots the number of diggs accumulated at differ-
ent ages for upcoming and popular stories as well as a
censored story. Despite that the diggs and digg rate of
the censored story at various ages are nearly one order
of magnitude higher than those of popular stories, it is
still not promoted at the time of writing (nearly two
months after story submission). The story will be un-
likely promoted noticing the flat tail of its curve. Our
findings indicate that Digg may bury stories by censor-
ing content before they are promoted to the front page.
Next, we examine ST to answer a question: Are Digg
users equally powerful or a few are more influential? For
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Figure 11: The average number of diggs received
at different ages for upcoming and popular sto-
ries as well as the number of diggs received for
a censored story in ST. The number of diggs
for an upcoming story includes all diggs received
from the submission of the story to the age of 3
days; The number of diggs for a popular story
includes only the diggs received prior to its pro-
motion time. For the censored story, we include
all diggs it received from submission to the end
time of ST.
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Figure 12: Digging behavior of users ranked by
Pi. Let P and U denote the number of popular
stories and upcoming stories in ST, respectively.
For a user i, the fraction of popular stories is
defined as Pi
P
; The fraction of total stories is
defined as Pi+P
′
i+Ui
P+U
, indicating the user’s digg
frequency.
a user i, let Pi, P
′
i, and Ui denote the number of i’s
diggs on popular stories prior to their promotion (i.e.,
user i’s diggs contribute to the promotion of the popular
stories), the number of i’s diggs on popular stories after
their promotion, and the number of i’s diggs on upcom-
ing stories, respectively. Then, we use digg success rate,
defined as Pi
Pi+Ui
, to measure user i’s digging power (i.e.,
capability of making an upcoming story popular). Note
that P ′i is disregarded in the digg success rate.
Figure 12 shows digging behavior of the users who
dugg in ST. Only 22.5% of the users in the Digg graph
dugg on stories as shown in Table 1. The x-axis de-
notes user ranks ordered decreasingly by their Pi. It
is straightforward that the fraction of popular stories
drops as the user rank decreases. The top 100 users
each contributes to the promotion of a significant por-
tion (14.4−34.6%) of the popular stories by their diggs.
Two important observations can be made in this fig-
8
ure. First, the top ranking users also have high fraction
of total stories, which means they are among the most
active users in digging. Second, the top 100 users all
have good digging power with digg success rate ranging
from 0.24 to 0.45. On the other hand, the low ranking
users are very divergent in digging frequency and dig-
ging power: some users dugg infrequently but with very
high success rate; some others dugg as much as some
top users but with very low success rate. Overall, the
top 100 users are more powerful because they not only
digg the most but also promote stories the most. Fur-
ther examination reveals that 76 of the top 100 users are
among top 0.1% (correspondingly 89 users are among
top 0.5%) of the total users ranked by PageRank al-
gorithm in the crawled graph. Because high-indegree
users tend to have high PageRank value and also they
tend to digg more as shown in Section 4.2, the high dig-
ging power of these top 100 users result from their high
visibility to the community. It is worth pointing out
that 30.2% of the top 0.1% users (ranked by PageRank
value) did not digg in the trace. This further renders the
top 100 users (shown in the figure) more influential in
story promotion. Interviews with Digg users [15] reveal
that the top users might exploit their digging power to
game the system.
4.5 Content Filtering vs User Diggs
A Digg user browses content in three ways: (1) using
the front page to browse recently promoted stories; (2)
using the upcoming page to view recently submitted sto-
ries; and (3) using the friends interface to see the stories
her friends have recently submitted or voted for. The
front page and the friends interface are essentially con-
tent filters, which sift content by the story promotion
algorithm and friends’ taste respectively. Undoubtedly,
content filtering influences how people view and rate
content.
The first question we raise is: Do friends’ diggs in-
fluence one’s votes? To answer the question, leveraging
VSM [11] in IR algorithms we introduce a concept of
vote similarity to quantify the influence of friends. For
a user u and her m friends, let X and Y denote the
user u’s and her friends’ digg vector respectively. The
digg vector X (or Y ) consists ofm (or n) (s, f(s)) pairs,
where s is the story the user (or her friends) dugg and
f(s) is the number of diggs on the story s by the user
(or her friends 4).
For each pair (si, f(si)) in a digg vector, we replace it
with (si, wi) by using the dampened scheme [21] where
wi = 1 + logf(si). Considering digg vector X , we nor-
malize it as follows: For each < si, wi > ∈X , we nor-
malize its weight wi and substitute it with a normalized
weight w′i =
wi√P
m
j=1wj
2
.
94If k friends vote for s, then f(s) = k.
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Figure 13: The left figure plots CDF of vote sim-
ilarity across users in ST. The right figure plots
average vote similarity across the users with the
same number of friends.
Following the above process, we get normalized digg
vectors X ′ and Y ′ for the user and her friends respec-
tively. Then, the vote similarity between the user u and
her friends is:
Sim(X ′, Y ′) =
∑
si∈X′∩Y ′
w′X′,i·w′Y ′,i (1)
The vote similarity lies in between [0, 1]: A high value
means a user has dugg many same stories with her
friends; a low value indicates the user and her friends
have dugg very few stories in common. Note that the
vote similarity exaggerates influence of friends because
a user digging on a same story with her friends does
not necessary suggest that the user follows her friends
(e.g., a user dugg a same story with her friends in co-
incidence or a user dugg a same story earlier than her
friends did). It represents the upper bound of friends’
influence.
Figure 13 shows vote similarity of users with their
friends. Two main observations can be made: (1) Most
of (97.2%) users have vote similarity of less than 0.4
with their friends while a few (1.9%) users have vote
similarity of more than 0.5 with their friends; (2) The
vote similarity for users with fewer number of friends (≤
200) is consistently low while that for users with higher
number of friends is divergent. Further examination
reveals that this is consistent with the correlation of
users’ diggs and their number of friends in Figure 7:
The number of diggs submitted by users with higher
number of friends spans a wide range, thus resulting in
a wide range of vote similarity. In summary, the friends
interface does not have substantial influence on most
users’ digging behavior.
Next, we explore how the front page impacts users
on viewing and digging stories. In addition to collected
diggs in ST, we have also gathered the users’ comments
on the stories over the duration of ST, for better char-
acterizing the users’ activities on content viewing and
rating. To quantify the impact of promotion on popular
stories, it is straightforward: For a popular story which
is promoted at age of t, we compare the visits (diggs
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Table 2: Impact of the front page on content
viewing and rating.
Upcoming Popular
Diggs −95.2% 455.9%
Comments −94.1% 559.8%
Diggs + Comments −95.1% 462.2%
and comments) received prior to promotion and those
received from age t to 2t. For upcoming stories, we use
t = 72 hours. This is because all popular stories are
promoted within 72 hours as mentioned in Section 4.3.
However, we do not claim that 72 hours are the choice
of the most appropriate. Table 2 shows impact of the
front page on content viewing and rating in terms of
percentage increase. The front page placement signifi-
cant boosts the number of votes and comments on the
popular stories by 4.6 − 5.6 times; the upcoming sto-
ries, sifted out by the promotion algorithm, rapidly lose
95% of user interactions. We thus conclude that story
promotion, as an information filtering technique, signif-
icantly affects how people browse and rate information.
Figure 14 shows both digg and story distributions
vs submission time distribution of the stories dugg by
users from 2009/03/17 to 2009/04/16. The diggs on
upcoming stories represents diggs on stories (includ-
ing prospective popular stories prior to their promotion)
while the diggs on popular stories represents diggs on
stories after their promotion. The y-axis is in log-scale.
Note that users dugg a small portion of very old stories
(even 5 years ago), including upcoming and popular sto-
ries 5. For the old popular stories (due to limited space
in Digg’s front page) and the old upcoming stories, they
both are significantly less viewed and rated and thus get
filtered. We have conjectured that users dugg them up
via the friends interface. The small portion of the old
stories and their diggs, confirms that influence of the
friends interface is not substantial. Story age adversely
affects diggs. For instance, recent stories (submitted
from 2009/03/17 to 2009/04/16) absorb 96.1% of all
users’ diggs. Moreover, it confirms that popular stories
draw significantly more votes than their counterparts
thanks to content filtering by the story promotion algo-
rithm, considering that the number of popular stories
is far less than that of upcoming stories.
4.6 Summary
We end this section with a brief summary of our find-
ings:
• An overwhelming majority of users digg stories in-
frequently while a small number of users are very
active (i.e., a couple hundred diggs per day). Ex-
95Even the first submitted story in 2004/12/01was dugg
by the users.
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Figure 14: Digg (story) vs submission time dis-
tributions of the stories dugg by users from
2009/03/17 to 2009/04/16.
amination of time intervals between each individ-
ual user’s consecutive diggs suggests existence of
digg spam and possible system gaming.
• Users with more visibility (i.e., more fans) tend
to digg more. Users are also more active in dig-
ging with increasing number of friends up to 200
friends; Beyond that, there is no strong correlation
of the number of friends and digging frequency.
Users are not equally powerful in digging stories.
A few top users have high digging power largely
due to their high visibility to the community.
• The number of diggs and digg rate are among de-
terminants of story promotion. Evidence indicates
that Digg is censoring content.
• Information filtering presented in Digg includes
the friends interface and the story promotion. The
friends interface influences users on viewing and
rating content, but not substantially; the story
promotion is substantially influential to users.
5. DISCUSSION
In this section, we discuss some implications of our
findings.
Design of Story Promotion Algorithm. The
story promotion algorithm is an important key to suc-
cess of online content voting networks like Digg because
it embodies a sense of democracy: It is Internet users’
own judgment and passionate participation that make
a story popular and surface it to the front page to re-
ceive several millions views per day. In the meanwhile,
the story promotion algorithm is becoming a point of
attack and gaming because the most profitable avenue
for attacks and system gaming is to get one’s content
(e.g., advertisement) promoted for catching such a large
amount of visits. For some reason Digg does not unveil
the story promotion algorithm. While showing impor-
tance of the number of diggs and digg rate to story pro-
motion, we believe that they are not all the pieces. A
good promotion algorithm should not treat all the votes
equally because of digg spam and Sybil attacks. A plau-
sible solution is to weigh votes by evaluating credibility
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of voters. That is, we favor votes from trusted source.
So, promotion of a story is not just simply summing up
all the votes but weighted aggregate of votes.
Our findings have some interesting implications for
gauging credibility of voters. Digg shows a much lower
level of link symmetry than many other social networks.
We may leverage the low level of link symmetry in Digg
graph to identify reputed sources of votes, as search
engines exploit this property to identify reputed Web
pages [16]. We ran PageRank algorithm on the Digg
graph and confirmed that high-indegree nodes tend to
have high PageRank value 6. Because Digg users do
not tend to reciprocate their fans casually, exploiting
the property of low link symmetry can defend against
Sybil attacks: Attackers may be able to create as many
identities as possible in a short time but it is difficult
for them to build up many incoming links quickly, so
they have low reputation scores and their votes are
lightly weighted; Even a large amount of such votes will
not subvert the promotion algorithm. However, well-
recognized users (with a high number of fan links) can
game the system as our findings reveal that these users
are usually top users with high digg success rate. To
counteract gaming by these top users, the promotion
algorithm may take into account a user’s voting his-
tory and dynamically adjust her reputation score (Ad-
ditive Increase/Multiplicative Decrease as an example
policy). As discussed earlier, inter-digg time can be
used to detect spam diggs and content censoring can be
used to identify those voters who have dugg on inappro-
priate content. When a user’s spam diggs or inappro-
priate diggs reach a threshold, her reputation score is
decreased multiplicatively. A similar policy can also be
applied to story submission. As a result, the influence
of a top user’s votes will be suppressed upon misbehav-
ior, making the promotion algorithm resilient to gaming
by the top users.
Recommendation-assisted Content Discovery.
One important mechanism in online content voting net-
works is content discovery which helps people find good
content. People can find content in the front page for
popular stories and upcoming page for recently sub-
mitted stories; however, the limited space of the front
page and upcoming page does not meet all users’ needs.
The friends interface allows a user to find the stories
her friends submitted and dugg, but our findings indi-
cates that it does not substantially influence users on
browsing and rating content. One plausible explanation
is that users do not find interesting what their friends
submitted and dugg. Indeed, most of users do not have
much vote similarity with their friends as shown ear-
lier. Thus, the friend list alone cannot provide good
96The founder of Digg, Kevin Rose, had the highest num-
ber (34, 217) of incoming links at the time of our crawl, and
thus had the highest value of 0.011.
recommendation on content. We can cluster system-
wide users based on their digg and submission activi-
ties 7 (e.g., by using bottom-up hierarchical clustering),
and like-minded voters are grouped into same clusters.
Users can go to a recommendation page consisting of
stories voted and submitted by their cluster members
to discover interesting content.
6. RELATED WORK
The most relevant work is research on social networks
which generally falls into two areas: some researchers
have focused on examining graph theoretic properties
of social networks [9, 17, 10, 18] and others have inves-
tigated usage patterns in social networks [12, 14, 19].
Adamic et al. [9] examine an early online social net-
work, Club Nexus, at Stanford University and show
that the network exhibits both small-world behavior
and strong local clustering. Kumar et al. [17] analyze
two online social networks Flickr and Yahoo! 360 and
find that both contain a large strongly connected com-
ponent. They also show a high level of link symmetry
in the two networks, with 70.2 − 80%. Backstrom et
al. [10] study group formation and evolution in Live-
Journal and present models for group evolution. Mis-
love et al. [18] present a large-scale measurement study
of structural properties in four online social networks:
Flickr, YouTube, LiveJournal and Okurt and confirm
the power-law, small-world, and scale-free properties of
online social networks. They also reveal high level of
link symmetry in the four network, with 62 − 100%.
Our results show that Digg social network, while show-
ing some similar structural properties with these online
social networks, exhibits a much lower degree of link
symmetry (39.4%).
Cha et al. [12] present an extensive data-driven analy-
sis on the video distribution, video popularity evolution,
and content duplication in YouTube. Golder et al. [14]
analyze message activities of online social networks of
college students in Facebook, and reveal that messaging
within Facebook exhibits robust and consistent tempo-
ral rhythms across campuses and across seasons. In re-
cent work, Nazir et al. [19] study usage characteristics of
three Facebook social network based applications, and
highlight that a small fraction of users account for the
majority of the activity within each application and a
small number of applications account for the majority
users on Facebook.
Chun et al. [13] investigate an activity network con-
structed from the comments users wrote in other guest-
books and find that the structural properties of the ac-
tivity network are similar to that of the social network
in Cyworld. To address the Sybil attacks on content
rating, Tran et al. [22] propose adaptive vote flow ag-
97Submission of a story can be viewed as a vote on the
story.
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gregation to aggregate users’ votes and limit the number
of bogus votes cast by attackers in vote aggregation no
more than the number of attack edges.
7. CONCLUSIONS
In this work we investigated the structural properties
and digging activities of Digg, an online content voting
network. The graph we crawled is WCC of the user
graph and the data of digging activities we collected
spans from 2004/12/01 to 2009/04/16. Our data shows
that the Digg social network differs from many other
online social networks in that it has a low level of link
symmetry and weak correlation of indegree and outde-
gree, and nodes tend to connect to nodes with different
degree from their own. We reveal that the number of
diggs and digg rate play an influential role in story pro-
motion, and we also present evidence of content cen-
sorship in Digg. Our findings suggest that the story
promotion algorithm, as an information filter, signifi-
cantly influences on viewing and rating content while
the friends interface is not substantially influential to
users. We show that users with high visibility tend to
digg stories more actively and that top users are those
who have high visibility and digg power. Our data also
suggests existence of spam diggs. We have outlined how
these findings may affect the story promotion algorithm
and content discovery for online content social networks.
In our next step, we plan to investigate the proper-
ties of the activity network constructed based on user
interactions: a directional edge from A to B is formed
if user A dugg or wrote a comment on B’s stories; and
the edge weight is proportional to the number of diggs
and comments A generated for B’s stories. The activity
network may lend insight into the actual dynamics of
interaction between users in online content rating net-
works.
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